AI-Assisted Secure Coding (Appendix C) · AI-Generated Infrastructure & Pipeline Artifacts
Dual control for pipeline triggers
Verify that changes to high-impact pipeline trigger configurations require both dual control and a security-team review, no matter who or what produced the change. The configurations in scope include GitHub Actions `pull_request_target` and `workflow_run`, self-hosted runner labels, workflow `permissions:` blocks, OIDC trust policies, and secret-environment mappings.
OWASP AISVS v1.01, requirement AC.7.4
In plain English
Changes to high-impact pipeline triggers need two people and a security review, whoever or whatever made them. Examples include pull_request_target, workflow_run, self-hosted runner labels, permissions blocks, OIDC trust policies and secret mappings.
What good looks like
- These settings are identified in your repositories.
- Changes need dual control and security review.
- Enforcement is automated.
How teams usually do it
- CODEOWNERS for workflow files plus rulesets that detect the listed settings.
Evidence an auditor would accept
- Rulesets and a reviewed change.
Common mistakes
- Protecting the main workflow file but not reusable workflows.
Not sure which requirements apply to your system? Take the assessment.
Requirement text from the OWASP AI Security Verification Standard, licensed under CC BY-SA 4.0. This guidance is shared under the same licence.